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People tend to encode and retrieve information in terms of schemata, especially when processing
resources are low. This study argues that the life-span schema about developmental goals constitutes a
generalized expectation about the life course that associates young adults with growth and older adults
with loss prevention. Predictions were that young and older adults possess this schema; that both age
groups rely on it when remembering age-associated information about goals; and that this schema
reliance is particularly pronounced among older adults, due to age-related difficulties in overcoming
schemata. In Experiment 1, participants assigned growth or loss-prevention orientations to young and
older faces and adhered to the life-span schema. In Experiment 2, participants were presented young and
older faces paired with growth or loss prevention. When later asked to recognize faces and remember
goal orientations, participants were more likely to remember young faces with growth and older faces
with loss prevention than vice versa. This effect was more pronounced among older adults. Conclusions
are that reliance on life-span schemata when remembering developmentally relevant information in-
creases with age.
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Schemata can guide how we perceive and remember our envi-
ronment, helping us to organize information and to reconstruct
memory (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Bartlett, 1932; Bransford &
Johnson, 1972). A schema is a general knowledge structure, a
framework, or a set of beliefs that represents and relates events,
percepts, situations, acts, and objects; summarizes redundancy in
the world; helps to reconstruct memory; and makes memory for
some details more likely than others (Bartlett, 1932; Reisberg,
1996). Despite often being accurate and beneficial in reducing
complexity, schemata can also lead to omissions or distortions in
representations of originally presented information, biases in en-
coding and retrieval, and systematic errors (Bartlett, 1932; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Owens, Bower, & Black, 1979).
Especially when attentional and processing resources are low,
which is more likely in late than in early adulthood, people tend to
encode and retrieve information in terms of general, schematic
features (Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989). Indeed, com-
pared with young adults, older adults have been found to rely more
on schematic knowledge when trying to retrieve information from
long-term memory. For example, they are more likely than young
adults to falsely recognize pictures that fall into the same category
as previously presented pictures (Koutstaal, Schacter, & Brenner,
2001) or to incorrectly attribute schematically related statements to
speakers associated with that schema (Mather, Johnson, & De
Leonardis, 1999). Neuropsychological correlates suggest that age-
associated increments in schema reliance are related to impaired
reflective processing, which critically depends on prefrontal brain
areas (Mather & Johnson, 2003). Individuals with lower perfor-
mance in tasks related to frontal brain region show, for instance,
more difficulty engaging in reflectively demanding tasks and in-
stead rely on simpler heuristic processes. In addition, older adults
may rely more strongly on earlier established schemata, as they
become less efficient in ignoring irrelevant or invalid information
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988), and they may accept highly accessible
responses as being veridical without further attempts at recollec-
tion (Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, 2005). Finally, older
adults’ greater susceptibility to misinformation and their stronger
reliance on preexperimentally established schemata could also
reflect their reduced ability to encode and monitor the source of
information (Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998) or their use
of inefficient binding mechanisms (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996;
Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2008).
In the present study, we were interested in the questions of
whether encoding and retrieval of information are influenced by
schemata that reflect people’s expectations regarding developmen-
tal changes across the adult life span and whether the effect of
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these schemata on memory is different for adults of different ages.
The present research therefore focused on a specific schema—the
life-span schema about developmental goals. We define this
schema as a knowledge scaffold that people can use to process and
organize developmentally relevant information and that reflects
their normative, generalized, and highly consensual expectation
about the developmental goals that are predominant in different
phases of the life course. Our concept of the life-span schema
about developmental goals is distinct from related concepts, such
as aging stereotypes, in that it emphasizes the potential effects of
schematic knowledge structures on how individuals process age-
relevant information.
The idea that developmental goals—that is, individuals’ ideas of
how they want to shape their own development—change through-
out adulthood is grounded in the long-held assumption in devel-
opmental psychology that individuals are confronted with an age-
sequential order of developmental tasks across the life span and
that these tasks are reflected in their goals (Erikson, 1968;
Havighurst, 1953). This age-related structuring of the life course is
based on age-graded, history-graded, and nonnormative factors
(Baltes, Cornelius, & Nesselroade, 1979; Heckhausen, 1999; Neu-
garten, 1968). In a given historical context, age-graded factors
(such as social norms or biological and social clocks) as well as
nonnormative events determine individuals’ opportunities and the
frame of reference for personal development (Freund & Wrosch,
2001). There is evidence that an age-sequential structure of life
tasks is reflected in age-normative expectations. Neugarten,
Moore, and Lowe (1968), for instance, showed that there is high
consensus between individuals with regard to their ideas of the
best age timing of a wide range of developmental tasks (see also
Plath & Ikeda, 1975; Settersten & Hagestad, 1996).
Furthermore, age-normative conceptions also reflect the system-
atic age-related changes in the proportion of gains to losses that
occur across various functional domains (Baltes, 1987, 1997;
Brandtsta¨dter, 1999; Labouvie-Vief, 1981; Staudinger, Marsiske,
& Baltes, 1995): Whereas young adulthood typically provides
levels of biological plasticity and environments that offer access to
resources and favor acquisition of skills and improvement of
functions, older people encounter fewer opportunities to realize
growth (Freund & Baltes, 2000; Freund & Ebner, 2005; Heck-
hausen, 1999). Indeed, there is evidence that young and older
adults expect more gains than losses in childhood, adolescence,
and early adulthood and expect a larger number of losses begin-
ning in middle-age and in late adulthood (Heckhausen, Dixon, &
Baltes, 1989; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993).
The changing ratio of resource gains to losses across the adult life
span is also reflected on the level of personal goals. Personal goals can
be distinguished in terms of their orientation toward growth (i.e.,
striving for gains and positive outcomes; e.g., “I want to become
healthy”) as compared with their orientation toward loss prevention
(i.e., avoidance of negative states; e.g., “I don’t want to become sick”;
Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; see Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996;
Emmons, 1996; Higgins, 1997; Markus & Nurius, 1986, for related
concepts). A growth orientation as opposed to an orientation toward
loss prevention has been found to prevail in early adulthood (Elliot,
Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Emmons, 1996) and seems to be more
functional with respect to task performance and well-being (Coats,
Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996; Friedman & Fo¨rster, 2001; Roney,
Higgins, & Shah, 1995). With advancing age and as net resources
decline, goal orientations increasingly shift toward maintenance and
loss prevention, with positive effects on well-being (Ebner et al.,
2006; Freund, 2006; Ogilvie, Rose, & Heppen, 2001).
The first purpose of the present study was to show that these
age-related changes in goal orientation are also reflected in peo-
ple’s normative expectations about the developmental goals of
adults of different ages, that is, that a life-span schema about
developmental goals exists (Experiment 1). The second purpose of
the present research was to examine whether adults, especially
older adults, rely on this schema when remembering age-
associated information about goals (Experiment 2).
In Experiment 1, participants performed a face–goal orientation
categorization task in which they assigned either growth or loss-
prevention orientations to the faces of young and older individuals.
Our hypothesis was that both young and older participants were more
likely to assign growth orientations to young faces and loss-
prevention orientations to older faces than vice versa.
In Experiment 2, participants performed a face– goal-
orientation memory task in which they were shown faces of young
and older individuals that were presented with either growth or
loss-prevention orientations. Later, participants were asked to rec-
ognize the initially presented faces among equal numbers of dis-
tractor faces and to remember which goal orientation had been
initially presented with each (correctly or incorrectly) recognized
face. We expected participants’ memory to be best for faces that
were initially encoded with goal orientations consistent with the
life-span schema about developmental goals (i.e., young faces
combined with growth orientations, and older faces combined with
loss-prevention orientations). We also hypothesized that the recall
of goal orientations would be influenced by whether the initial
association reflected respective age-normative expectations: We
expected participants to be more likely to correctly remember
growth orientations initially combined with young faces and loss-
prevention orientations initially combined with older faces. With
regard to falsely recognized faces, we hypothesized that partici-
pants would be more likely to attribute growth orientations to
young faces and loss-prevention orientations to older faces than
vice versa. In addition to these general effects, we expected older
adults to rely more heavily on the life-span schema when encoding
and retrieving new information, reflecting their impairment in
forming schema-inconsistent associations and overcoming preex-




Twenty-four young (20–29 years, M  23.9 years, SD  2.6)
and 24 older participants (71–85 years, M  76.6 years, SD 
3.8)1 took part in Experiment 1. Participants were drawn from the
participant pool of the Max Planck Institute for Human Develop-
ment. The sample was stratified by gender and education: Fifty
percent of the young and 50% of the older participants were
women, and 54% of the young and 54% of the older participants
1 One older male participant did not finish the computer task for time
reasons.
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had a higher secondary level of education (comparable to 2 years
or more of college). Cognitive characteristics were comparable to
those of previously published samples.2
Procedure, Design, Measures, and Materials
Overview. Experiment 1 consisted of one test session.
Young and older participants were tested in separate sessions.
First, participants were informed about the testing procedure
and signed a consent form before responding to a short socio-
demographic questionnaire and working on the Digit Symbol
Substitution Test (Wechsler, 1981). Then, participants rated
each of the 160 faces used as experimental stimuli in this study
along various dimensions (face– goal-orientation categorization
task, described in the following section). At the end of the
session, participants were asked to indicate their own current
mood on a 3-point scale (0  sad, 1  neutral, 2  happy). The
session typically took 150 min, including two 5-min breaks
about every 45 minutes. All participants were debriefed and
received monetary reimbursement.
Face–goal-orientation categorization task. Participants were
shown 160 faces, one at a time, on Apple Power Mac G5 1.8-GHz
computers (Apple, Inc., Cupertino, CA). The presentation order
followed a randomized age- and sex-matched design: Each ran-
domized order was presented to 1 person per age and gender
group, resulting in 12 different presentation orders. Across these
12 presentation orders, we controlled for the mean position of each
picture in the sequence. Participants rated each face in terms of the
depicted person’s attractiveness, likeability, distinctiveness, goal
orientation, energy, mood, and age (for specific instructions, see
Appendix A). Wordings and descriptive information on the ratings
of young and older faces for each of the dimensions are summa-
rized in Table 1.
Source and selection of facial stimuli. The faces used in Ex-
periment 1 were taken from the Productive Aging Laboratory
(PAL) Face Database (Minear & Park, 2004). From this larger
database, we selected 160 faces (80 young, 80 older, evenly
distributed across gender). Selection criteria were that the faces (a)
were White, (b) matched the targeted age groups (i.e., belonged to
persons that were either between the ages of 18 and 32 years or 70
years and older), (c) did not display any distinctive features, and
(d) showed a neutral facial expression. When necessary, we mod-
ified the selected pictures by standardizing them with respect to
contrast effects, background color, and color of clothes (see Ebner,
2008).
Results
The percentage of categorizations of growth and loss-
prevention goal orientations to young and older faces in the two
age groups are graphically summarized in Figure 1. To accom-
modate the hierarchical structure of the data (i.e., ratings of
faces nested within participants) and to examine within-person
and between-person differences at different levels of analysis
simultaneously, we used multilevel random coefficient model-
ing (MRCM; Nezlek, 2001; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2001). All
analyses pertaining to MRCM were conducted with hierarchical
linear and nonlinear modeling (HLM, Version 6; Raudenbush,
Bryk, & Congdon, 2000).
The categorization of a growth or loss-prevention orientation to
a face constituted the dependent variable in the model. At the
between-person level, we used age group of participant as a
predictor variable to examine whether participants’ categorization
2 Young and older participants did not differ in their self-reported
current mood. As usually reported in the literature, young and older
participants did, however, differ in their processing-speed performance,
F(1, 46)  36.6, p  .05, p2  .44, with young participants (M  59.5,
SD  11.4) scoring higher than older participants (M  40.5, SD  10.4).
Table 1
Wordings and Descriptive Information About Ratings of Young










M 1.46 1.68 1.23
SD 0.57 0.56 0.65
Likeabilityb (0–4 points)
M 1.82 1.89 1.75
SD 0.42 0.46 0.45
Distinctivenessc (0–4 points)
M 1.85 1.86 1.83
SD 0.55 0.58 0.56
Goal orientationd (% of responses)
Growth
M 54.0 73.0 35.0
SD 10.2 16.0 16.3
Loss prevention
M 46.0 27.0 65.0
SD 10.2 16.0 16.3
Energye (0–4 points)
M 2.14 2.26 2.02
SD 0.40 0.44 0.44
Moodf (% of responses)
Sad
M 17.0 13.0 21.0
SD 8.0 7.6 10.7
Neutral
M 55.0 59.0 51.0
SD 13.7 15.7 14.0
Happy
M 28.0 28.0 28.0
SD 11.7 13.3 11.8
Ageg (0–7 points)
M 2.39 0.43 4.35
SD 0.30 0.23 0.51
Note. a Response to question “How attractive is this person?” rated on a
scale from 0 (not attractive at all) to 4 (very attractive). b Response to
question “How likeable is this person” rated on a scale from 0 (not likeable
at all) to 4 (very likeable). c Response to question “How distinctive is this
person?” rated on a scale from 0 (not distinctive at all) to 4 (very
distinctive). d Response to question “I think this person would like to
improve or to prevent loss in functioning” indicated with either 0 (improve;
i.e., growth) or 1 ( prevent losses). e Response to question “How ener-
getic is this person?” rated on a scale from 0 (not energetic at all) to 4 (very
energetic). f Response to question “What mood is this person in?” indi-
cated with either 0 (sad), 1 (neutral), or 2 (happy). g Response to ques-
tion “How old is this person?” indicated with 0 (20–30 years), 1 (30–40
years), 2 (40–50 years), 3 (50–60 years), 4 (60–70 years), 5 (70–80
years), 6 (80–90 years), or 7 (90–100 years).
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of goal orientations to faces varied as a function of the partici-
pants’ age group. At the within-person level (i.e., the level of
individual faces), we introduced age group of face as a predictor
variable to examine whether the participants’ categorization of
goal orientations to faces varied as a function of the age group of
the faces. In addition, the cross-level interaction between age
group of participant and age group of face was entered into the
model to examine age-related differences in the within-person
association between the faces’ age group and categorization as
having either growth or loss-prevention orientation. The response
options for the outcome variable were dichotomous (0  improve,
1  prevent losses). We therefore conducted a multilevel logistic
regression using restricted penalized quasi-likelihood as the
method of estimation (see Hox, 2002). The MRCM results for the
categorization are presented in Table 2. The top of Table 2 presents
the fixed part of the model (i.e., average effect for age group of
participant, average effect for age group of face, and cross-level
interaction effect for Age Group of Participant  Age Group of
Face). The random effect (i.e., variance component) is presented at
the bottom of Table 2.
The significant random effect of age group of face indicated
that there were interperson differences in categorizations of
goal orientations to faces. As indicated by the fixed effects, the
relative chance of assigning loss-prevention orientation to older
faces was almost 7 times the chance of assigning loss preven-
tion to young faces (odds ratio  6.88, p  .05). The relative
chance of assigning growth orientation to young faces, in turn,
was almost 7 times the chance of assigning growth to older
faces. Young and older participants did not differ in their
assignments of goal orientations to faces (odds ratio  1.07,
ns). This finding is also evident in the results of additional
models, tested separately for young and older faces with age
group of participant as the predictor of the goal orientation
assigned to that face: Young and older participants were equally
likely to assign growth or loss-prevention orientations to young
faces (odds ratio  0.89, ns) and older faces (odds ratio  0.95,
ns).
These results support our assumption that individuals in both
age groups classify faces of different ages on the basis of a
life-span schema about developmental goals that attributes









































Categorization of growth orientation to young faces
Categorization of loss-prevention orientation to young faces
Categorization of growth orientation to old faces
Categorization of loss-prevention orientation to old faces
Figure 1. Percentage of categorizations of growth and loss-prevention goal orientations to young and older
faces in young and older participants. Error bars represent two standard errors.
Table 2
Categorization of Goal Orientations to Faces as a Function of
Age Group of Participant and Age Group of Face: Results of











Intercept 0.32 0.32 2.18
Age group of participant 0.89 0.89 0.95
Age group of face 6.88 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 1.07 — —
Random effects
Intercept 1.05 1.02 0.74
Age group of face 2.56 — —
Note. Dependent variable, categorization of goal orientation to faces, was
coded as 0 (improve) and 1 ( prevent losses). Age group of participant was
coded as 0 (young participants) and 1 (older participants). Age group of
face was coded as 0 (young face) and 1 (older face).
Reported parameter estimates are odds ratios, indicating the ratio of the odds
of loss-prevention categorizations in one group (as specified by the indepen-
dent variables) to the odds of loss-prevention categorizations in another group.
An odds ratio of 1 indicates that loss-prevention categorizations were equally
likely in both groups. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that loss-
prevention categorizations were more likely in the group coded 1 than in the
group coded 0. An odds ratio less than 1 indicates that the loss-prevention
categorizations were less likely in the group coded 1 than in the group coded
0. Parameter estimates are explained in the text. Dashes indicate not applicable.
 p  .05.
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goals primarily to older adults. Young and older participants did
not differ in their categorizations, suggesting that they do not
differ reliably in their life-span schema about age-group differ-
ences in goal orientations. This is consistent with the notion of
a normative, generalized, and highly consensual expectation
about the life course and developmental goals.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether both age groups, but
especially older adults, rely on the life-span schema about devel-
opmental goals when remembering new associations between
faces of different ages and goals with different orientations. In
doing so, our aim in Experiment 2 was to integrate the findings of
Experiment 1 and the evidence of increased schema reliance in
older age reported in the literature.
Method
Participants
Fifty-nine young (19–31 years, M  24.7 years, SD  3.2) and
60 older participants (69–79 years, M  73.5 years, SD  2.9)
took part in Experiment 2. Participants were recruited through
newspaper ads. The sample was approximately stratified by gender
and education: Forty-nine percent of the young and 50% of the
older participants were women, and 59% of the young and 62% of
the older participants had a higher secondary level of education.
Physical and cognitive characteristics were comparable to those of
previously published samples.3
Procedure, Design, Measures, and Materials
Overview. Experiment 2 comprised two measurement points
(T1, T2). For the majority of participants (96%), T1 and T2 were
exactly 1 week apart.4 Young and older participants were tested in
separate sessions. Participants were first informed about the testing
procedure and signed a consent form. After generating their most
important personal goals in the domain of cognitive functioning,
participants received instructions on how to handle the computer
program for the experimental task (i.e., encoding phase, described
later), and the computer program provided practice trials. There
was time for questions in case participants needed further clarifi-
cation of the constructs or the task. Then the Spot-a-Word Test
(after Lindenberger, Mayr, & Kliegl, 1993) and the Digit Symbol
Substitution Test were administered.
T2 began with the experimental computer task (i.e., recognition
phase, described later). Again, in addition to the experimenter’s
instruction, the computer program provided practice trials. Partic-
ipants then completed a computerized version of the Paired-
Associate Learning task (after Brehmer, Li, Mu¨ller, von Oertzen,
& Lindenberger, 2007). Both sessions typically took 120 min each.
Participants were debriefed and received monetary reimbursement.
Generation of personal goals. To trigger participants’ own
motivational orientation at the beginning of the study, we asked
participants to list their three most important goals in the domain
of cognitive functioning. To facilitate goal generation, we pro-
vided a short explanation of the concept of personal goals, which
included sample goal domains and goals and which also intro-
duced the idea of growth and loss-prevention goals (for specific
instructions, see Appendix B). Participants generated goals such as
“Improve my language skills” or “Counteract memory losses,”
which clearly suggest that the concepts of growth and loss-
prevention goals were well understood.
Face–goal-orientation memory task. Stimuli were presented
on Apple Power Mac G5 1.8-GHz computers. The face–goal-
orientation memory task had two phases (see Figure 2; for specific
instructions, see Appendix C): an encoding phase (at T1) and a
recognition phase (at T2). At encoding, participants were shown
32 pairs of a goal orientation and a person’s face. First, one of two
goal orientations—growth (“Cognitive functioning: Improve”;
original German wording: “Geistige Fa¨higkeiten: Verbessern”) or
loss prevention (“Cognitive functioning: Prevent losses”; original
German wording: “Geistige Fa¨higkeiten: Verluste vermeiden”)—
was presented. After 1.5 s, a face was shown in addition to the goal
orientation. Presented faces belonged to one of two age groups
(i.e., between 18 and 32 years or 70 years and older). All faces
displayed a neutral facial expression. Four stimuli were presented for
each possible combination of Goal Orientation  Age of Face 
Gender of Face (i.e., growth–young–male, growth–young–female,
loss prevention–young–male, loss prevention–young–female,
growth– older–male, growth– older–female, loss prevention–
older–male, loss prevention– older–female). The face– goal-
orientation combinations were presented in an age-matched ran-
domized order: Each randomized order was presented to one
young and one older participant. To ensure elaboration of the
face–goal-orientation association, the computer program asked
participants to think of a specific activity with which the presented
person might pursue the respective goal and to press a button as
soon as they came up with such an activity.5 Independent of the
button press, the presentation time for each face–goal-orientation
combination was fixed to 30 s. Participants were then asked to type
in the specific goal-pursuit activity they had come up with (exam-
ples of such self-generated goal pursuit activities were “Play a
musical instrument,” “Take a class in English as a foreign lan-
guage,” “Read books/the newspaper,” and “Keep a diary”). After
an interstimulus interval of 1.5 s and the presentation of a fixation
3 Young and older participants neither differed in their self-indicated
subjective functioning nor in their self-reported cognitive functioning, both
measured by single-item indicators. They did differ, however, in their
processing-speed performance, F(1, 117)  111.0, p  .01, p2  .49, in
that young participants (M  58.0, SD  10.8) scored higher than older
participants (M  39.3, SD  8.4). In addition, young participants (M 
22.8, SD 5.2) did worse in the Spot-a-Word Test, measuring knowledge,
than older participants did (M  29.0, SD  2.9), F(1, 117)  65.7, p 
.05, p2  .36. Finally, there were age-group differences with regard to
memory performance in Paired-Associate Learning task, such that young
participants (M  11.9, SD  3.1) performed better than older participants
(M  4.4, SD  3.0), F(1, 115)  175.1, p  .05, p2  .60.
4 One older male participant was tested after 6 days, 2 older men and 1 older
woman were tested after 8 days, and 1 young woman was tested after 9 days.
5 Post hoc analysis of participants’ response times of button presses during
encoding to indicate successful self-initiated processing (i.e., generation of
specific goal-pursuit activity for the face–goal-orientation association as a
direct indicator of association ease) showed that the age groups did not differ
with respect to ease of responding to the different face–goal-orientation
combinations (Wilks’   .98), F(3, 115) 27.0, ns, 2  .02, 1   .22.
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cross for another 1.5 s, the next goal orientation and face–goal-
orientation combination appeared on the screen.
At T2, 1 week later, a two-step recognition phase followed.
Participants were shown 64 faces displaying neutral facial expres-
sions. Half of the faces had been presented at T1 (target faces); an
equal number of male and female faces of young and older
individuals were new (distractor faces). Target and distractor faces
were counterbalanced across participants. The faces were again
presented in an age-matched randomized order; that is, each ran-
domized order of 64 faces was presented to one young and one
older participant. For each presented face, participants first made
an old–new judgment (face recognition: “Have you seen this
person before?” with response options being seen before or not
seen before). For each face indicated as being recognized from T1,
irrespective of whether this was correct or incorrect, participants
were then asked to remember the goal orientation that the face had
been presented with at T1 (recall of goal orientation: “What type
of goal did this person pursue?” with response options being
improve or prevent losses; original German wording: “Verbessern”
or “Verluste vermeiden”). Finally, participants were asked to type
in the specific goal-pursuit activity for the person they had come
up with at T1. Then, after an interstimulus interval of 1.5 s and the
presentation of a fixation cross for 1.5 s, the next face appeared on
the screen.
Source and selection of facial stimuli. The faces used in Ex-
periment 2 were a subset of those used in Experiment 1. We used
information from participants’ ratings in Experiment 1 and se-
lected 64 faces that were sufficiently homogeneous with respect to
ratings of attractiveness, likeability, distinctiveness, and mood.
Self-reported expectations about young and older adults’ goal
orientations. At the end of T2, participants rated the goal orien-
tation of their own and the respective other age group in the
domain of cognitive functioning separately along the dimensions
of growth (“With their goals in the domain of cognitive function-
ing, young/older adults would like to improve something”) and
loss prevention (“With their goals in the domain of cognitive
functioning, young/older adults would like to prevent a loss”).
Response options ranged from 1 (does not apply at all) to 8
(applies very well).
Results
First, we present analyses on self-reported expectations about
age-group differences in goal orientations. Second, we report re-
sults for the face–goal-orientation memory task.
Self-Reported Expectations About Age-Group Differences
in Goal Orientations
We tested whether young and older participants, when asked
explicitly, expected growth to be the primary goal orientation in
young adulthood and loss prevention to be the primary goal
orientation in old age. The results are presented in Figure 3. A
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on self-reported
expectations about goal orientations with age group of participants
(young, older) as the between-subjects factor and age– goal-
orientation combination (young adults– growth, older adults–
growth, young adults–loss prevention, older adults–loss preven-
tion) as the within-subject factor yielded a significant main effect
for the age–goal-orientation combination, Wilks’   .45, F(3,
115)  47.4, p  .05, p2  .55, and a significant interaction,
Wilks’   .84, F(3, 115)  7.4, p  .05, p2  .16. As predicted,
both age groups adhered to a schematic representation about
age-group differences in goal orientations: Young and older par-
ticipants regarded growth as the primary orientation in young adults
and loss prevention as the primary orientation in older adults. The
only difference that emerged between the age groups was that, in
comparison to young participants, older participants expected young
adults to have a more pronounced loss-prevention orientation.
The central purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether
the life-span schema about developmental goals influences mem-
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Figure 2. Face–goal orientation memory task. Faces were presented in color on dark gray background.
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dress this point, we analyzed three aspects of participants’ memory
performance at T2: (a) their face recognition, (b) their recall of
goal orientations for correctly recognized faces (target faces), and
(c) their attribution of goal orientations for incorrectly recognized
faces (distractor faces).
Memory Performance at T2
Face recognition memory. At T2, 1 week after initial encod-
ing, participants indicated whether or not each of 64 faces (32
targets, 32 distractors) had been presented at T1. We conducted a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test for age-group
differences in face recognition. The number of correctly recog-
nized faces and number of correctly rejected faces were the de-
pendent variables. Young and older participants differed in their
overall face recognition memory performance, Wilks’   .60,
F(2, 116)  39.4, p  .01, p2  .40. Young participants (M 
26.5, SD  4.7) recognized more faces correctly than did older
participants (M  24.6, SD  4.7), F(1, 117)  4.86, p  .05,
p
2  .04. Furthermore, young participants (M  29.5, SD  2.7)
rejected more faces correctly than did older participants (M 
23.7, SD  4.7) F(1, 117)  70.0, p  .01, p2  .37.
To then investigate whether young and older participants were
more likely to recognize young faces initially combined with
growth orientations and older faces initially combined with loss-
prevention orientations than vice versa, we again used MRCM.
The recognition of target faces at T2 constituted the dependent
variable. At the between-person level, we used age group of
participant as the predictor variable to examine whether partici-
pants’ recognition of target faces varied as a function of partici-
pants’ age group. At the within-person level, we introduced age
group of face at T1 and goal orientation of face at T1 as predictor
variables to examine whether participants’ recognition perfor-
mance varied as a function of faces’ age group and faces’ goal
orientation. In addition, the cross-level interactions—Age Group
of Participant  Age Group of Face, Age Group of Participant 
Goal Orientation of Face, Age Group of Face  Goal Orientation
of Face, and Age Group of Participant  Age Group of Face 
Goal Orientation of Face (all referring to T1)—were entered to
examine age-related differences in the within-person association
between age group of face, goal orientation of face, and correct
recognition of faces. As the outcome variable was dichotomous
(0  missed recognition of target face, 1  correct recognition of
target face), we again conducted multilevel logistic regressions.
The MRCM results for the recognition of target faces as a
function of age group of participant, age group of face, and goal
orientation of face are presented in Table 3. The random effects did
not reach significance. With respect to the fixed-effects results, the
effect for age group of participant (odds ratio 0.38, p .05), the
effect for goal orientation of face (odds ratio 0.68, p .05), and
the interaction between Age Group of Participant  Age Group of
Face (odds ratio  2.86, p  .05) reached significance. To follow
up on this significant interaction, we conducted separate analyses
for young and older faces. Age group of participant, goal orienta-
tion of face, and Age Group of Participant  Goal Orientation of
Face (all at T1) served as predictor variables in these models.
Compared with young participants, the older participants’ relative
chance of recognizing young faces was only 0.4 (odds ratio 
0.40, p  .05). It is interesting that there was no age-group
difference with respect to older faces (odds ratio  1.17, ns). In
line with our hypotheses, the relative chance of correctly recog-
nizing young faces initially combined with loss-prevention goal
orientations was only 0.71 times the chance of correctly recogniz-
ing young faces initially combined with growth goal orientations
(odds ratio  0.71, p  .05). However, no such effect of the goal
orientation of the face on the correct recognition of faces was
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 *
Figure 3. Young and older participants’ self-reported expectations about age-group differences in goal
orientations. Error bars represent two standard errors. Follow-up univariate comparisons between young and
older participants: young adults—growth ( p  .05), older adults—growth ( p  .05), young adults—loss
prevention, F(1, 117)  15.1, p  .01, p2  .11, older adults—loss prevention ( p  .05).  p  .05.
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groups did not differ in their recognition of young (odds ratio 
1.41, ns) or older faces (odds ratio  0.77, ns) as a function of the
faces’ goal orientation.
Taken together, the results up to this point partly support our
assumption that participants’ face-recognition performance was
influenced by the combination between age of face and goal
orientation at encoding. Young faces that had initially been pre-
sented with loss-prevention orientations were less likely to be
correctly recognized than young faces that had initially been
presented with growth orientations. In contrast to our expectations,
however, no differences were found for older faces. Furthermore,
young and older participants’ face-recognition performance was
not differentially influenced by faces’ age and goal orientation.
However, irrespective of face–goal-orientation combinations at
encoding, older participants were worse than young participants at
recognizing young faces but did not differ from young participants
in recognizing older faces.
Recall of goal orientations for correctly recognized faces. For
each face that participants indicated as having recognized from
T1, they were also asked to remember the goal orientation with
which it had been presented. These responses either referred to
(a) faces that participants had correctly recognized as having
been presented at T1 (target faces) or (b) faces that participants
had falsely indicated as having been presented at T1 (distractor
faces). Whereas responses referring to target faces may have
been based on actual recognition processes—at least partially
and in addition to attribution processes—responses to distractor
faces were solely based on participants’ attributions of goal
orientations to faces.
We begin with MRCM analyses of participants’ recall of goal
orientations for correctly recognized faces. The recall of goal
orientations of target faces at T2 constituted the dependent
variable. At the between-person level, we introduced age group
of participant as the predictor variable. At the within-person
level, we introduced age group of face at T1 and goal orienta-
tion of face at T1 as predictor variables. In addition, we entered
the cross-level interactions—Age Group of Participant  Age
Group of Face, Age Group of Participant  Goal Orientation of
Face, Age Group of Face  Goal Orientation of Face, and Age
Group of Participant  Age Group of Face  Goal Orientation
of Face (all referring to T1)—into the model to examine age-
related differences in the within-person association among age
group of face, goal orientation of face, and recognition of goal
orientation of faces. Again, as the outcome variable was dichot-
omous (0  incorrect recall of goal orientation, 1  correct
recall of goal orientation), we conducted multilevel logistic
regressions.
Figure 4 summarizes the MRCM results for these analyses. The
random effects of age group of face, goal orientation of face, and
Age Group of Face  Goal Orientation of Face were significant.
This indicated that there were interperson differences in recall of
goal orientations of target faces. With regard to the fixed-effects
results, the effects that reached significance were as follows: age
group of participant (odds ratio 5.24, p .05); age group of face
(odds ratio 0.43, p .05); goal orientation of face (odds ratio
0.45, p  .05); and the interactions between age group of partic-
ipant and age group of face (odds ratio  0.07, p  .05), between
age group of participant and goal orientation of face (odds ratio 
0.03, p  .05), between age group of face and goal orientation of
face (odds ratio  5.50, p  .05), and between age group of
participant, age group of face, and goal orientation of face (odds
ratio  152.5, p  .05).
To follow up on the significant interactions, we assessed sepa-
rate models for young and older faces with age group of partici-
pant, goal orientation of face, and Age Group of Participant 
Goal Orientation of Face (all at T1) as predictor variables. Table 4
shows that the older participants’ relative chance of choosing the
correct goal orientation for young faces was more than 5 times the
young participants’ chance (odds ratio  5.17, p  .05). Note that
young faces paired with growth orientation were more likely to be
correctly remembered than young faces paired with loss-
prevention orientation. Therefore, as will be shown later, this
greater likelihood for the older adults to choose the correct goal
orientation for young faces reflects their greater schema-induced
bias rather than their superior memory. With regard to older target
faces, the older participants’ relative chance of correctly remem-
Table 3
Recognition of Target Faces as a Function of Age Group of
Participant, Age Group of Face, and Goal Orientation of Face:
Results of Multilevel Random Coefficient Modeling in
Experiment 2
Variable








Intercept 7.30 6.96 6.02
Age group of participant 0.38 0.40 1.17
Age group of face 0.91 — —
Goal orientation of face 0.68 0.71 0.82
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 2.86 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Goal Orientation of Face 1.44 1.41 0.77
Age Group of Face  Goal
Orientation of Face 1.10 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 
Goal Orientation of Face 0.56 — —
Random effects
Intercept 0.81 0.73 1.29
Age group of face 0.48 — —
Goal orientation of face 0.01 0.00 0.12
Age Group of Face  Goal
Orientation of Face 0.17 — —
Note. Dependent variable, recognition of target faces, was coded as 0
(missed recognition of target face) and 1 (correct recognition of target
face). Age group of participant was coded as 0 (young participants) and 1
(older participants). Age group of face was coded as 0 (young face) and 1
(older face).
Reported parameter estimates are odds ratios, indicating the ratio of the
odds of correct categorizations of target faces in one group (as specified by
the independent variables) to the odds of correct categorizations of target
faces in another group. An odds ratio of 1 indicates that correct categori-
zations of target faces were equally likely in both groups. An odds ratio
greater than 1 indicates that correct categorizations of target faces were
more likely in the group coded 1 than in the group coded 0. An odds ratio
less than 1 indicates that correct categorizations of target faces were less
likely in the group coded 1 than in the group coded 0. Parameter estimates
are explained in the text. Dashes indicate not applicable.
 p  .05.
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bering the goal orientation was 0.38 times the young participants’
chance (odds ratio  0.38, p  .05).
The relative chance of correctly recalling the goal orientation of
young faces initially encoded with loss prevention was only 0.44
times the chance of correctly remembering the goal orientation of
young faces initially encoded with growth (odds ratio  0.44, p 
.05). This effect was more pronounced in young than in older
participants (odds ratio  0.03, p  .05). With regard to older
faces, the opposite effect was found: The relative chance of cor-
rectly recalling the goal orientation of older faces initially encoded
with loss prevention was 2.41 times the chance of correctly re-
membering the goal orientation of older faces initially encoded
with growth (odds ratio  2.41, p  .05). Confirming our expec-
tations, this effect was stronger in older than in young participants
(odds ratio  4.08, p  .05).
In sum, both age groups were more likely to correctly remember
the goal orientation for young faces initially presented with growth
orientations than the goal orientation for young faces initially
presented with loss-prevention orientations. Furthermore, partici-
pants in both age groups were more likely to correctly recall the
goal orientation of older faces initially presented with loss preven-
tion than older faces initially presented with growth. All of these
tendencies were considerably stronger in older adults than in
young adults.
Attribution of goal orientations to falsely recognized faces.
The analyses up to this point investigated participants’ memory for
goal orientations of target faces. We now turn to the question of
which goal orientations participants attributed to faces that they
falsely indicated as having been presented at T1.
Using MRCM, we made attribution of goal orientations to
falsely recognized faces the dependent variable. At the between-
person level, we used age group of participant as the predictor
variable to examine whether participants’ attribution of goal ori-
entations to distractor faces varied as a function of the participants’
age group. At the within-person level, we introduced age group of
face as the predictor variable to examine whether participants’
attribution of goal orientations to distractor faces varied as a
function of age group of the faces themselves. In addition, we
entered the cross-level interaction Age Group of Participant Age
Group of Face to examine age-related differences in the within-
person association between age group of face and attribution of
goal orientations to distracter faces.6 The outcome variable was
again dichotomous (0  improve, 1  prevent losses), and we
conducted a multilevel logistic regression.
Table 5 summarizes the results. The significant random effect of
age group of face indicated that there were interperson differences
in attributions of goal orientations to distractor faces. The fixed-
effects results show that the relative chance that older participants
attributed loss-prevention orientations to distractor faces was only
0.18 times the young participants’ chance (odds ratio  0.18, p 
.05). Furthermore, the analysis showed that the relative chance that
participants attributed loss-prevention orientations to older faces
was almost 3 times the chance they attributed loss-prevention
orientations to young faces (odds ratio  2.98, p  .05). Further-
more, the interaction Age Group of Participant  Age Group of
Face again reached significance (odds ratio  6.05, p  .05).
Separate follow-up models for young and older faces with age
group of participant as the predictor variable showed that young
and older participants differed in terms of their attributions of goal
orientations to young distractor faces: Older participants’ relative
chance of attributing loss-prevention orientations to young faces
was only 0.18 times the chance of young participants attributing
loss-prevention orientations to young faces (odds ratio 0.18, p
.05). With regard to older faces, the two age groups were equally
likely to attribute growth or loss-prevention orientations (odds
ratio  1.09, ns).
6 Eleven young participants and 1 older participant did not falsely
recognize distractor faces as target faces. Consequently, due to the two-step
recognition procedure, these 12 participants had “logically missing data”
for the attribution of goal orientations to distractor faces and were excluded
from the respective analyses. This resulted in a reduced sample size of 107


















































Correct recall of growth orientation for young faces
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Figure 4. Age-group differences in percentage of correct recall of goal orientations of correctly recognized
faces as a function of age of face and goal orientation at encoding. Error bars represent two standard errors.
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Discussion
Integrating cognitive–psychological perspectives on age-group
differences in information processing and social–psychological
perspectives on age trajectories and developmental goals, we in-
vestigated how age-normative conceptions about developmental
goals influence memory in norm-conforming ways and in an
age-differential manner. Experiment 1 established the existence of
a life-span schema about developmental goals in both young and
older adults. Experiment 2 showed the influence of such life-span
schema on memory for age-associated information about goal
orientations and revealed increased schema reliance in older adults
compared with young adults.
Young and Older Adults Possess a Life-Span Schema
About Developmental Goals: Improvement for the Young,
Loss Prevention for the Old
Both young and older adults were more likely to categorize
young faces as having growth orientations and older faces as
having loss-prevention orientations than vice versa, suggesting that
they both possess a life-span schema about developmental goals
(Experiment 1). This result is in line with theoretical assumptions
(Freund & Baltes, 2000; Staudinger et al., 1995) and with empir-
ical findings about age-normative expectations about the life
course (Heckhausen et al., 1989; Neugarten et al., 1968). It is
further supported by the self-reported expectations about age-
group differences in goal orientations obtained in Experiment 2:
When asked to indicate their expectations about other young and
older adults’ goal orientations, both young and older participants
regarded growth as the primary orientation in young adults and
loss prevention as the primary orientation in older adults. Finally,
the presence of a life-span schema about developmental goals is
also in accordance with findings of age-group differences in per-
sonal goal orientations (Ebner et al., 2006; Ogilvie et al., 2001),
with young adults reporting a primary orientation toward growth
and older participants reporting an increasingly stronger orienta-
Table 4
Recall of Goal Orientations of Target Faces as a Function of
Age Group of Participant, Age Group of Face, and Goal
Orientation of Face: Results of Multilevel Random Coefficient
Modeling in Experiment 2
Variable








Intercept 1.74 1.75 0.77
Age group of participant 5.24 5.17 0.38
Age group of face 0.43 — —
Goal orientation of face 0.45 0.44 2.41
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 0.07 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Goal Orientation of Face 0.03 0.03 4.08
Age Group of Face  Goal
Orientation of Face 5.50 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 
Goal Orientation of Face 152.50 — —
Random effects
Intercept 0.76 0.72 0.96
Age group of face 2.71 — —
Goal orientation of face 2.55 2.35 3.43
Age Group of Face  Goal
Orientation of Face 9.73 — —
Note. Dependent variable, recall of goal orientations of target faces, was
coded as 0 (incorrect recall of goal orientation) and 1 (correct recall of
goal orientation). Age group of participant was coded as 0 (young partic-
ipants) and 1 (older participants). Age group of face was coded as 0 (young
face) and 1 (older face). Goal orientation of face was coded as 0 (improve)
and 1 ( prevent losses).
Reported parameter estimates are odds ratios, indicating the ratio of the
odds of correct recall of goal orientation in one group (as specified by the
independent variables) to the odds of correct recall of goal orientation in
another group. An odds ratio of 1 indicates that correct recall of goal
orientation was equally likely in both groups. An odds ratio greater than 1
indicates that recall of goal orientation was more likely in the group coded
1 than in the group coded 0. An odds ratio less than 1 indicates that the
recall of goal orientation was less likely in the group coded 1 than in the
group coded 0. Parameter estimates are explained in the text. Dashes
indicate not applicable.
a Due to “logically missing data,” chi-square statistics are based on only
118 (nyoung  59; nolder  59) of 119 units with sufficient data for
computation.
 p  .05.
Table 5
Attributions of Goal Orientations to Distractor Faces as a
Function of Age Group of Participant and Age Group of Face:
Results of Multilevel Random Coefficient Modeling in
Experiment 2
Variable








Intercept 0.62 0.64 1.86
Age group of participant 0.18 0.18 1.09
Age group of face 2.98 — —
Age Group of Participant 
Age Group of Face 6.05 — —
Random effects
Intercept 0.98 0.87 0.74
Age group of face 2.47 — —
Note. Dependent variable, attribution of goal orientations to falsely rec-
ognized faces, was coded as 0 (improve) and 1 ( prevent losses). Age group
of participant was coded as 0 (young participants) and 1 (older partici-
pants). Age group of face was coded as 0 (young face) and 1 (older face).
Reported parameter estimates are odds ratios, indicating the ratio of the odds of
loss-prevention attributions to falsely recognized faces in one group (as specified
by the independent variables) to the odds of loss-prevention attributions to falsely
recognized faces in another group. An odds ratio of 1 indicates that loss-prevention
attributions were equally likely in both groups. An odds ratio greater than 1
indicates that loss-prevention attributions were more likely in the group coded 1
than in the group coded 0. An odds ratio less than 1 indicates that the loss-
prevention attributions were less likely in the group coded 1 than in the group
coded 0. Parameter estimates are explained in the text. Dashes indicate not
applicable.
a Due to “logically missing data,” chi-square statistics are based on only 73
(nyoung  17; nolder  56) of 107 units with sufficient data for computation.
 p  .05.
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tion toward loss prevention in their personal goals.7 Note, how-
ever, that the present investigation did not permit examination of
the directionality of the link between personal goal orientation and
age-normative expectations about developmental goals.
Life-Span Schema About Developmental Goals Influences
Memory for Age-Associated Information About Goal
Orientations: Increasing Schema Reliance for
Developmental Goals With Age
In Experiment 2, we found that young and older participants’
memory for the face–goal-orientation associations was influenced
by their life-span schema about developmental goals. Thus, al-
though the representation of a life-span schema about develop-
mental goals was not different for young and older adults
(Experiment 1), such a schema had an age-differential influence
on memory for age-associated, goal-related information (Ex-
periment 2).
With respect to participants’ face-recognition performance,
young faces initially encoded with loss-prevention orientations
were less likely to be correctly recognized than young faces
initially encoded with growth orientations. It is interesting that
young and older adults differed in their face-recognition perfor-
mance as a function of the age group of the face: Older participants
were better at correctly recognizing older faces than at recognizing
young faces, irrespective of the goal orientation with which the
faces had initially been presented. This finding is consistent with
evidence of an own-age bias in face recognition (Anastasi &
Rhodes, 2006; Ba¨ckman, 1991). According to this line of research,
adults of different ages have a better memory for faces of their own
age group than for faces of other age groups. The effect is often
explained by a higher frequency of exposure to, and therefore
higher familiarity with, faces in the same as opposed to other age
groups (Ebner & Johnson, in press). Whereas some studies of
own-age bias have suggested that the effect is more pronounced in
young than in older adults (Ba¨ckman, 1991; Bartlett & Fulton,
1991), others have found the effect only in older adults (Lamont,
Stewart-Williams, & Podd, 2005). In line with these latter studies
and with laboratory crime simulations (Yarmey, 1984), we ob-
served the bias only in older participants. It is possible that older
adults primarily focus on stimuli that are most important or salient
to them (such as individuals of similar ages) in order to counteract
limited cognitive resources or due to that limitation.
Young and older participants’ recall of goal orientations for
target faces and their attribution of goal orientations for distractor
faces were influenced by the life-span schema about developmen-
tal goals. Both these effects were more pronounced in older than in
young participants. In the case of schema-incongruent face–goal-
orientation pairs, binding the face to the goal orientation probably
required binding of information that is contradictory to the schema
and therefore likely required active suppression of the schema. The
data clearly show that older adults had more difficulties than
young adults in overcoming their age-normative expectations
about developmental goals and more strongly relied on the preex-
perimentally established schema when remembering new face–
goal-orientation associations. This finding is in line with the liter-
ature on increasing schema reliance with age (Koutstaal et al.,
2001; Mather et al., 1999). It is especially interesting (and extends
earlier results on this issue), given that the information presented
in this study was highly age- and self-relevant, and one could
therefore have expected young but also older adults to remember
it without having to rely on a preestablished knowledge scaffold.
The literature on age-associated changes in memory offers var-
ious (partly interrelated) explanations for increasing schema reli-
ance with age. Dual-process theories of recognition memory, for
instance, posit that the ability to remember the past is supported by
two processes—recollection (remembering) and familiarity
(knowing; Tulving, 1984; Yonelinas, 2002). There is considerable
evidence that recollection processes are markedly impaired with
age, whereas familiarity shows little or no age-related decline
(Daselaar, Fleck, Dobbins, Madden, & Cabeza, 2006; Mantyla, 1993).
As recollection and the ability to overcome habits decrease in old age,
older adults are more susceptible to false memories or biases (Jacoby,
1999; Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 2001; Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, &
Lindenberger, 2009) and make attributions on the basis of familiarity
(Grady & Craik, 2000), and familiarity may be more strongly influ-
enced by schematic information than by recollection.
Age-associated failure of inhibitory processes (Hasher & Zacks,
1988) might also play a role. Older adults might rely more strongly
on earlier established schemata, as they become less efficient at
ignoring irrelevant or invalid information. They might become
more easily “captured” by highly accessible responses and accept
them as being veridical without further attempts at recollection
(Jacoby et al., 2005), presumably also because of the relative ease
of processing and retrieving schema-based information (Hess &
Slaughter, 1990; Rabinowitz, Craik, & Ackerman, 1982; Yekovich &
Walker, 1986). When unable to recollect past events, older adults may
go with the first response that comes to mind, and this response might
be schema-consistent rather than schema-inconsistent. Processing dif-
ferences during both encoding and retrieval may contribute to the
observed age changes in schema reliance.
Another explanation draws upon the literatures on source mem-
ory and source confusion (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;
Kliegl & Lindenberger, 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Accord-
ing to this approach, older adults’ greater susceptibility to misin-
formation and their stronger reliance on preexperimentally estab-
lished schema reflect their reduced ability to encode and monitor the
source of information (Henkel et al., 1998). At least part of older
adults’ deficient episodic memory performance can also be attributed
to their decreased ability to create and retrieve associations among
units of information (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), possibly due to re-
duced linkage strength (MacKay & Burke, 1990), decreased effi-
7 This finding was also confirmed in the present study: At the end of
Experiment 2, we assessed information on participants’ personal goal
orientation across their three self-generated goals. A 2  2 repeated
measures ANOVA on subjective ratings of personal goal orientation with
age group of participants (young, older) as the between-subjects factor and
personal goal orientation (growth, loss prevention) as the within-subject
factor yielded a main effect for personal goal orientation, Wilks’   .72,
F(1, 117)  46.6, p  .05, p2  .29, and an interaction, Wilks’   .88,
F(1, 117)  16.7, p  .05, p2  .16. As expected, young participants
reported a stronger personal goal orientation toward growth (M  7.0,
SD  1.0) compared with loss prevention (M  5.0, SD  2.0). Older
participants did not differ in their personal goal orientation toward growth
(M  6.6, SD  1.4) and toward loss prevention (M  6.1, SD  1.9), but
they did report a stronger personal goal orientation toward loss prevention
than young participants did.
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ciency of the simultaneity mechanism (Salthouse, 1996), or inefficient
associative-binding mechanisms (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Li,
Naveh-Benjamin, & Lindenberger, 2005; Shing et al., 2008).
In conclusion, the present research provides converging evidence
across different assessment levels (self-report, categorization, or
memory), some referring to more conscious and others to less con-
trollable levels. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show that
young and older adults possess a life-span schema about developmen-
tal goals and that this life-span schema affects memory for age-
associated information about goal orientations—especially so in older
individuals. There are likely implications of schema reliance for
development goals. In the course of their lives, people build up
schemata that help them to reduce the complexity of their environ-
ment and that largely correspond with reality. Reliance on the life-
span schema about development goals can be efficient in that it helps
people to structure and simplify information and facilitates rapid (and
often accurate) processing and integration of new information. In this
sense, an accurate schema may be especially beneficial for older
adults in that it allows them to counteract age-related cognitive de-
cline that makes encoding and memory for new information difficult.
When at odds with reality, however, reliance on the life-span schema
leads to mistakes and biases as shown in the present study. The
stronger the schema reliance, the less able the person will presumably
be to overcome it either during encoding or while remembering. The
present study showed the influence of the life-span schema about
developmental goals on how information is encoded and retrieved. It
remains to be seen whether this schema also has an impact on the type
of behavior in which a person actually engages. One could assume
that the more pronounced the life-span schema, the more likely a
person would also engage in schema-consistent behaviors, which
might then render young adults less likely to perceive opportunities
for loss prevention and older adults less likely to realize chances for
growth and improvement.
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Appendix A
Instructions for Face–Goal-Orientation Categorization Task in Experiment 1
In this task, 160 young and older faces will appear on the
computer screen, one at a time. Your task is to respond to a series
of questions for each face by button press. A face and a question
always appear together. The next face appears as soon as all
questions for this face have been answered. There is no “right” or
“wrong”; we are interested in your spontaneous, personal opinion.
Appendix B
Instructions for Generation of Personal Goals in Experiment 2
People generally have quite a few ideas about how they want
to live their life, what they personally plan, and what they wish,
would like, or would not like. Such projects or plans can pertain
to various different life domains (e.g., leisure, social relation-
ships, thinking and cognitive functioning). They can pertain to
the distant or near future (e.g., “Keep up my memory for names
and new things in the next years” or “Learn some Italian in the
next couple of days”). They can pertain to everyday
matters (e.g., “Solve a crossword puzzle every day”) or to more
far-reaching issues (e.g., “Live a mentally active life”).
Please write down what you wish for personally, what you
would like, and what you would not like in the domain of
cognitive functioning at present and in the next weeks, months,
and years.
Appendix C
Instructions for Face–Goal-Orientation Memory Task in Experiment 2
Encoding Phase
In this task, faces of different persons will be presented on the screen,
one at a time. Each of these persons pursues a goal. Some persons pursue
the goal to improve their thinking and their cognitive functioning (e.g.,
“Learn a new language”). Other persons pursue the goal to prevent losses
in their thinking and their cognitive functioning (e.g., “Not to forget
names and faces”). Your task is to come up with a specific goal-pursuit
activity for each person to help him or her reach his or her goal.
Recognition Phase
In the last session, we showed you faces of different persons
who pursued different goals. This time you will again see
pictures of persons, one at a time. Your task is to decide
whether you saw that person in the last session. If you signal
that you have seen a person before, we will ask you to indicate
whether that person pursued the goal to improve his or her
thinking and cognitive functioning or the goal to prevent losses
in that domain.
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